Abstract
Introduction
Regulation is about more than states, laws, and enforcement mechanisms. Recent contributions to the literature on legal regulation suggest that regulation comprises a complex interrelationship between private (contract) and public (statute) law and between formal (rules) and informal (customs) regulatory tools (Co llins, 1999; Parker et al, 2004) . In contrast to the popular assumption that pri vatization and contractualism mean less law, less regulation and less state intervention -this literature argues that regulation is increasi ng and expanding. In part the justification for th is view is the thesis that developments in science and technology are creating a more "risky society". At an empirical level, studies have demonstrated that while privatization may mean less state provision of goods and services, pri vate provision is often underwritten by creating more law and new regulatory instruments and agencies. Changes to the regulation of industrial relations have certainly adhered to this tendency. This paper examines the regulation of the labour markets of Australia and New Zealand. Since the mid 1980s both labour markets have undergone substantial institutional change. In both countries, unions have suffered substantial decli ne, employer assoc tattons have remodeled themselves, and the dominant framework of compulsory arbitration has been ei ther weakened (in Australia) or dismantled (in New Zealand). In both countries there has been a transition from collective bargaining to individualization of the employment relationship, which, according to popular pronouncements represents a movement from a regulated to deregulated labour market. In dismissing the notion of a deregulated labour market, the aim of the paper is to highlight the continuities in patterns of labour market regulation that underlie the formal changes to institutional structures and bargaining instruments.
As it seeks to explai n the functions of regulation, political economy can offer industrial relations insights into the process of institutional change. In particular this paper applies the notion of an embedded economy -as deve loped by Karl Polanyi -to the case of labour market restructuring in Austral ia and New Zealand. The paper exami nes the impact of the substantial institutional changes introduced in both countri es from the mid-1980s on the pattern of labour market regulation. More specifica lly the paper asks whether there has been a fundamental shift towards a market based system of regulation or, alternatively, whether the process of change has seen the emergence of new institutions that perform the same or similar regulatory functions.
The first section of the paper highl ights some of the limitations of using a conventional industrial relations perspective to understand labour market restructuring. The second section then demonstrates the case for using a political economy perspective to understand the developments in labour market regulation. The third section of the paper reviews the comparative literature on Australian and New Zealand industrial relations. This section identifies the reasons for an explosion of interest in trans-Tasman comparisons in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and hi ghlights the shortcomings of the methods used to compare the respecti ve cases of labour market restructuring during this period. In the face of the substantial institutional changes that have occurred since the 1980s, section four high lights examples of continuity in the patterns of industrial relations in both Australia and New Zealand.
Regulation and Industrial Relations
A general defin ition of industrial relations might be the study of the regulation of the employment relationship.
1 Such a definition of the field reveals at least three important shortcomings. First, when exami ning the interaction of emp loyment and work, most observers look only at the rights and obligations that stem fro m the contract of employment. Left out of the equation are a range of different types of employment and work experiences includ ing vo lunteering, unpaid domestic labour and self-emp loyment {Edwards, 2003: 1-2).
Second, by examinin g the dymani cs of power, conflict and bargaining around the formal empl oymen t relationship, industrial relations research has become segregated from research on social security. As new patterns of employment such as the growth of casual isation have eroded the tradi ti onal (male) model of fu ll time employment, it is essential that the fields of industrial relations and social security together ex plore how workers ga in or lose enti tl ements and access to both employment. and social, protection. Safarti and Bonoli (.2002) wam that changi ng patterns of labour market participation, including population aging, pose signifi cant challenges that require labour market policy makers to integrate emp loyment protection and soc ia l securi ty.
Third, industri al relations research, since the pioneering work of the Webbs in the United Kingdom and Commons in the Uni ted States, views regu lation as occu rring through the rules made and ad mini ste red by institution al ' actors.-These ac tors include, especially in the case of Austra lia and New Zealand, arbitrati on tribunals (and other mechanisms of state intervention), as we ll as employer and emp loyee assoc iations. At a time of co nsiderable labour market restructuring, many observers ha' e examined the causes of institutional decay and ways to rcill\ igorate traditional labour market instituti ons. The most ob"ious exmnplc is the considerable literature de' oted to understanding, and offeri ng suggestions to redress. the decline in uni oni zati on that has occurred ~H:ro::.s a number of developed countries (eg Fairbrothcr and Gri !'fin 2002) . The adopt ion of the so ca ll ed '\Hga nizing mode l" has been a particular source of pn:occupation for Australian and New Zealand industria l relations researc hers.
Useful as they may be, studies that demonstrate a dec lin e in unit)nisat ion might te ll us little unless they exp lore th e crucial link between unionisation and co llecti ve bargaining coverage, and di sc uss how alternati ve fonns or representation or regulation complement, or continue ttl _Perform, those funct ions in the absence of a strongly unlt)lll:,cJ labour movement. Exampl es from European industrial relations systems include statutory prov isions that ex tend the coverage and benefits of collective bargaining from union to non-union work ers, and alternative forms of emp loyee representation, such as \\'tHk cnuncils. that have statutory rights to enable cmployL·e involvement in decision making at the Wt)rkphtcc. lt is in cou ntries. like the United States. that ha\ e both low levels of unionisation and co llecti ve bargaining coverage, th at access to alternati ve forms of representation becomes a most Important policy 1ssue (Freeman and Rogers 1 999).
By focusing on the fortunes of particular institutional actors, industrial relations research has then tended to overlook the more fundamental functions performed by labour market institutions and how these functions might be affected by institutional change. In part, there has tended to be an assumption that the erosion of institutional structures equates to a transition from a regu lated to de-regulated labour market. If we accept that the market is itself a form of regulation then the notion of a de-regulated labour market becomes absurd (eg Shearing 1993). What is referred to as deregulation is more accurately a process of regulatory contestation in whi ch societal structures of regulation may give way to market-oriented forms of regulation. According to Blyth The contemporary neo-liberal economic order . . . is an attempt once again to di s-embed the market from society, to roll back the institutions of social protection and replace them wi th a more market-conforming institutional order.
The weakening of institutions of employment protection such as trade unions and arbitration tribunals has accompanied the decentralization of bargaining to the level of the firm or th e individual employer/employee. This process does not represent a regulatory void. In the first place, there is a good case fo r seeing the firm as a non-market institution of regu lati on (Adams 1992) . Second, whi le decentralization brings the regulation of the empl oyment relationship closer to the direct parties, it is a process that may well be underwritten by increased state intervention, to strengthen the protection of individual rights. As Johnstone and Mitchell (2004: 11 7-11 8) have observed:
The withdrawa l of public regulation by the state does not necessaril y reduce the sheer amount of ' regulatory' public law the return to market-based, or ' private', arrangements has been accompanied by a marked increase in regulatory instruments, norms and agencies.
Of course, state intervention to promote indi vidual rights may simultaneously weaken protecti ons that support institutional collecti ve employment regulation.
To th e ex tent that some traditi onal structures of labour market regu lation are in decline, industrial relations needs to broaden its understandi ng of the role of different types and fo rms of regulation. Rather than viewing regulation as the study of institutions and their rules, we might suggest that regu lation in a broad sense encompasses a range of means, both formal and in formal, to influence or direct behaviour. Regu lation research goes so far as to suggest that informal regulatory tools -such as negative publicity, public critici sm, shaming and embarrassmentmay have a more important long term influence than formal sanctions (Parker and Braithwaite 2003) . A similar approach has guided changes to the regulation of occupational hea lt h and safety, wi th education, training and the input of the direct parties in developing codes of conduct now playing an increasingly important role, with legal prosecutions reserved for the worst offenders.
A Political Economy Perspective
In order to better understand and compare institutional functions it is useful to look beyond industrial relations to broader theoretical frameworks within the political economy or institutional economics tradition. It is important to note that industrial relations researchers have followed the stream of institutional economic thought developed most clearly by John Commons (Kaufman, 1998) . As well as founding one theoretical stream of institutional economics, Commons wrote extensive ly on American industrial and labour relations (see Hodgson 2003) . The stream of institutional econom ic thought developed by Thorstein Veblen, wh ich views institutions as rituals, norms or habits of thought -rather than particular structures -has not been embraced by industrial relations researchers. Also overlooked by industrial relations researchers are important contributions from political economics, of which one of the most glari ng is the work of Karl Polanyi. Although increasingly recognised as a major contribution to twentieth century social science (Block 2003 ; Munck 2002 ), Polanyi 's work remains poorly understood in industrial relations despite its centrality to that field of study.
3 Polanyi (J 957) claimed institutions became "embedded" in market exchanges because the factors of productionland, labour and money -cannot be traded as commodities. Institutions brought the market back to society and, in the case of the labour market, prov ided workers with employment and social protection. Polanyi advanced the notion of a "double movement", whereby efforts to enable a self-regu lating market wou ld be met by the countervail ing force of institutions of societal regulation.
Polanyi completed his most famous work The Great
Transf ormation in the post Second World War environment of increased state intervention in the market economy. His analysis is an historical, poli tical economi c account of the transiti on from the economi c liberalism of a self-regulated market to an institutionally embedded welfare economy (Stanfield 1980) . A key question that arises in a time when tradit ional labour market institutions are becoming di s-e mbedded is what alternative mechanisms emerge to perform the same institutional fu nctions? In other words, how does the market remain embedded in social relations?
In a recent reappraisal of The Great Transfo rmation, Block (2003) argues that inherent in Polanyi 's thes is was the notion of a permanently embedded economy. Thus;
. . . within societies, governments -even in the most market-oriented pol ities -continue to play a central role in economic li fe by organizing the key fictitious commodities (land, labor, and money) and by engaging in a wide variety of protective measures (Block 2003: 289) .
It is this notion of "permanent embeddedness" that I will use to frame the case of labour market regu lation in the context of institutional change m Australia and New Zealand.
Comparing Labour Market Regulation in Australia and New Zealand
In comparative industrial relations, Australia and New Zealand are examples of most similar cases. They are small, neighbouring, settler soc ieties, with close cultural and sport ing traditions, and histories of very sim ilar labour market regu lation. By the end of the 1800s or very early 1900s, both coun tries had extended the franchise to the working class (universally in New Zealand in 1893); elected labour represen tatives to parl iament, introduced forms of social security protection; enacted anti-sweating legislation; and introduced systems of compulsory arb itration to regulate industrial relations (Castles, 1985; Ramia, 1998) . The advent of compulsory arbitrationwhich occurred first in New Zealand, from 1894 -produced a uniquely "Antipodean" pattern of labour market regulation. State agencies gained the authority to sett le disputes and make binding agreements (known as awards in both countries) that prescribed wages and work ing cond itions for specific occupational or industry groups.
Despite these simi larities, cross-Tasman industrial relations research has not been we ll developed, apart from a concerted effort to compare the fates of the two systems during the period of 1980s and early 1990s (Bray and Howarth , 1993; Walsh, 1995 and Bray and Neilson 1996) . At thi s time, the two systems seemed to have diverged qu ite dramatica lly. Those researching the period sought to explai n the apparent differences predominantly in terms of institu tional fac tors, including Australia's federal political system whi ch set limits on the power of the Commonwea lth government to regul ate industri al relations. By comparison the New Zealand system produced what some have called "elected dictatorships". Accordi ng to this explanation, the diffe rence in polit ica l systems. and the absence of constitutional restrai nt , allowed regu lators in New Zealand to push forward reforms that were much more radica l than th ose deve loped in Australia (Schwartz, 1994 ) .
The comparati ve research examm mg the period of the 1980s and early 1990s is limited in a number of respects. Although plausib le, the institutional explanation tends to overl nok or simpli fy the differences in the worki ngs of the systems of industrial relations in the two countries. If reform to the Australian system remained hamstru ng by constitutional constraints, th is restriction has only applied at the federal level. Australia's "federal" political and industrial relations systems present j urisdi cti onal complex ities that have no parallel in New Zealand's uni tary and uni cameral poli tical structure. As Ramia ( 1998) argues, arbitration was eas ier to abo lish in New Zealand than it has proven to be in Australian because New Zealand traditionall y relied upon extra-arbitral mechanisms of state intervention. These have included the development of statutory minimum wages and eq ual employment opportunities outside the arbitral system.
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Another weakness of the comparative research dealing with the 1980s and early 90s is that it examines a relative ly short period of institutional divergence. A vai I able research examining the period since the mid1990s demonstrates a trend towards institutional reconvergence. Thus, while New Zealand reformers achieved substantial institutional change during the 1 980s and early 1990s. Australian regul ators have done much to bridge the gap from the mid-1 990s (Wailes, 1997; Barry and Wailes, 2004) . Moreover, given its focus on the 1980s and 90s, the comparative research draws insufficient attention to the importance of earlier divergent trends. These included the development of "second tier" (or en terprise) bargaining during the 1960s (Walsh 1984) . The loss of credibility the Arbi tration Court suffered following the events surround ing its infamous ''nil wage" order of 1968 (Walsh 1994 ) and amendments to the arbitration system introduced in 1973 solidified and further underwrote the development of free collective bargaining (Boxall, 1990) . That the fi nal abolition of compulsory arbitration in 1991 was made possible by earlier developmen ts which had underm ined the system's legitimacy has been overlooked by most commentators, who saw the EC A as a watershed in New Zealand industrial relations.
The comparative research also fails to pay sufficient attention to th e underl ying interests that drove the different policy responses and institutional outcomes on both sides of the Tasman (Wa ilcs and Ramia, 2002; \\'ailcs. Ramia and Lansbury. 2003) . Historical ly, these differences of interest reflected the rel ative importance of manufacturing (in Australia) as opposed to farming (in New Zealand) concerns. the greater extent to which peak organized labour became embedded in the Australian arbitration system (Gardner. 1995: Bray and Walsh, 1995) and the degree to which arbitration itself operated alongsi de (as in New Zealand) or to the exclusion of (as in Austra lia) other mechanisms that provided ernrloyment and social protection ( Ramia. 1998) . The Cl)lltribution of those who have critically reviewed the CL1rnparat ivc literature is to show that underlying institutions arc interests, and divergent interests shape I)Utl'l)mcs more fundanH~ntally than institutional structures. The i ne Ius ion of materia I interests prov ides a ,·aluabk addition to the ex tant institutional ana lysis of i\ustr:..Jiia n and New Zealand industrial relat ions.
Institutional Change a nd Regulatory Continuity in Australia and New Zealand
At the heart of the weakness in the comparative Australian!Ncw Zealand literature comparing the period t)f 19XOs and 90s is the assumption that labour market outcomes arc determined by particular institutional strllctures. How and why these institutional structures l'merged in the first place is not emphasized. Cuns~qu~ntly. questions cone~m ing how and why ~xisting institutional functions might endure under different institutional st ructures arc also u nd~remphasi zc d.
Another manifestation of the preoccupation wi th institutional structures rather than instituti onal functions -is the tendency to make comparisons between countries with very similar institutional structures rather than countries with very different institutions that nevertheless perform very similar regulatory functions. In part the similarities in institutional structures of labour market regulation have been what has prompted comparisons between Australia and New Zealand, in the tradition of the most similar case method (see Wai les 1999). To the extent that many structures could be held constant, researchers have attributed much of the apparent di ffe rence to the fewer examples of institutional divergen ce. As has been mentioned, a clear example is the lack of attenti on given to the factors that led to the introduction of the ECA in New Zealand compared to the attention given to some specific institutional outcomes that followed the introduction of the legislation.
When fo rmal institutional change is as substantial as it was in New Zealand at the time the ECA replaced the arbitration system in 199 1, there is a tendency to consider the changes as representing a watershed in labour market deregulation , rather than as signi fy ing a change in the instituti onal structure of regulation. Although the ECA abolished the arbitral structures of collective employment regulation, the Act created new employment institutions and arguably strengthened ex isting protections of indiv idual employee rights. In seeking to contextualise the institutional changes of the last l 0-1 5 years on the pattern of labour market regulations in Australia and New Zealand, the following discussion focuses on the affect of these changes on bargaining structures and on the relati onship between bargai ning instruments and barga ining outcomes.
Structural Change: Arbitration vs. Bargaining
At its peak compul sory arbitration regu lated the wages and conditions of the vast majority of workers in both Australia and New Zealand. Compulsory arbitration funct ioned as an effective tool of labour market regu lation because occupational or industry awards detcnnined, on a mu lti-employer basis, that wages were tak en out of competition. This gave empl oyers little reason to oppose unionization and, with the ass istance of tariff protection, employers in many parts of the economy cou ld afford to pay "fair and reasonable" wages. Compulsory arbitration provided a "classic compromise" between the interests of employers and employees much as systems of collective bargai ning did in other countries (Adams, 198 1 ) .
In a changed econom ic climate, the Austra lian arbitration system has been diminished by the emergence of en terprise bargaining. Estimates of official data show that approx imately 20-25 per cen t of, predominantly low paid, employees remain "award only". A furthe r 20 per cent of employees have "above award" wages bu ilt on the award entitlements. A larger group of 35-40 per cent of empl oyees have a registered certified agreement. A remainin g 20 per cent of employees are employed on indi vidual agreements, the majority of which are unreg istered (common law) contracts (Watson et al 2003:112 Burgess and Macdonald 2003) . Yet, the Commission still plays a central role in regulating awards, and the outcomes of other bargaining instruments are also set in relation to awards. Before certification, enterprise agreements must satisfy the Commission's no disadvantage test. This test also applies, at the Federal level, to Australian Workplace Agreements even though these agreements are vetted by a separate authority (the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA)). Given this requ irement, arbitration arguably continues to set a floor for the wages and conditions of the increasing proportion of employees covered by alternative bargaining instruments.
In a comparative study of six union movements, Hugh Clegg (1976) argued that the Australian compulsory arbitration system was analogous to a system of collective bargaining. Clegg offered this assessment on the basis of observations about the extent of over-award bargaining and the ability of the parties to reach agreement through consent provisions. In light of the institutional changes introduced by successive tabor and Coalition governments it may be the case the structural changes wrought have not dramatica lly changed the pattern of Australian industrial relations.
Institutionally, the New Zealand system has changed considerably. When the Nati onal Government abolished the remaining pillars of arbitration in 1991 , it replaced them with other employment institutions; the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court. At the same time, the state strengthened the regulation of workers' individual rights by extending personal grievance protection to all employees. Any employee could file a personal grievance if they unfairl y suffered a disadvantage in any area of employment. The transiti on from collective to indi vidual rights was reflected in both the marked decline in recorded industrial disputes and the marked increase in personal gri evance claims during the 1990s. The ERA represents then an attempt not to reregulate the New Zealand labour market but rather an attempt to re-collecti vise it through the provisio n of new supports for collective bargaining and unionization. As mentioned however these provisions appear more dramatic on paper than in practice. Moreover, while there are a small number of substantively different clauses in the ERA, there are a very large number of prov isions th at mirror those contai ned within the ECA.
Bargaining Instruments and Outcomes: Individualization and Collectivism
The introduction of New Zealand 's ECA signified a formal shift from collective employment regulati on to individualization. In the first few years of the Act, unionization and formal coll ective bargaining coverage declined dramatically. However closer analys is of thi s period reveals some important contin uities. As unionization plummeted, alternative forms of employee representation emerged. By the end of the ECA era. 15 percent of the non-unionised collective work force had an alternative form of representation (Harbridge Crawford & Kiely, 2000: 16) . Many of these alternative representative bodies became unions when the ERA introduced a new requirement that on ly unions could negotiate collective agreements (Barry and May 2004) .
More important to the continuity of existing patterns of industri al relations was the nature of the indi vidual contacting that deve loped under the EC A. As Anderson ( 1999) and Oxenbridge ( 1999) observed. individual contracting occurred predominantly on a procedural. not substanti ve, basis. For ex1stmg employees individualization meant that their award conditi ons were rolled over into a (possibly identical) indiv idual agreement. This process happened automatically if either party (usually the empl oyer) refused to negotiate a new collective agreement. New employees typically signed a standard form individual agreement. often on a "take it or leave it" basis. Under either of these scenarios. employees found that indi vidual con tracting offered litt le opportunity to actuall y negotiate individual terms and conditions of emp loy ment (MeA ndrew and Ballard. 1995).
For employers, procedural individualization had a number of benefi ts. For anti-union empl oyers. procedurnl individualizati on. coupled with other prov1s1ons contained wi thin the EC A. provided a means to derecognise unions. Although the ECA required em pl oyers to recognize an employee's barga inin g agen t. the Ac t did not requi re the part ies to negotiate. Unions lost their ability to represent thei r members in the sense that they iost the power to compel empl oye rs to bargaining ...:ollectivcly. espec ially on a mult i-employer basis. The Act also restricted the ability of un ions to gain access to the workplacc. Meanwhil e. the Cou rts, particu larl y the Court of Appea l. interpreted the Act as givin g sanctity to the con tract of employment. The courts accepted individual contracts even in instances where employee signed under duress. Proced ural indi viuualiza tion enabled employers to offer separately to each employee an iden ti cal contract. and in "negoti ations" employees would be unable to threaten to coll ec ti ve ly wi thdraw thei r labour to improve their bargaining posi tion. On the other hand. employers rea lized that substanti ve indi vidualisation would involve considerable "tran saction costs" 1n negot1atmg and managing se parate and distinct agreements, as we ll as th reate ning to disrupt the norms in the workplace. such as wage relativity. that arc fundamenta ll y co llecti ve.
In Australia the growth in A WA s shows the same tendencies. Follow ing a very slow take up of statutory indi vidua l contracting, the OEA has recently reported a substantia l (47 per cen t) growth in A WA approvals between the 2002-03 and 2003-04 financial years. Through its online web site, the OEA prov ides facilities for compani es or bargaining agents to lodge multiple agreements si multaneously as well as to create and save company templ ates. The onlin e service also provides a range of industry templates that users can download. and modify shou ld they wish to. The OEA also reports a Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2004 substantial increase in electronic lodgement of agreements (from 66 to 83 per cent) and an increase in the number of available framework agreements (from 13 to 31) which, coupl ed with the company templates and multiple agreemen t fac ilities, suggest the growth in individualization may be fue lled by procedural.
If this type of contracting commenced in New Zealand, under the ECA. the ERA has not reversed it. In fact, the ERA has created new incenti ves to for indi viduals to "free ride". The ERA requires employers to offer new employees the terms and conditions of a relevant collec ti ve agreement for the first 30 days of employment. At that point employees must elect to retain the collecti ve conditions as a paid up union member or sign and individual agreement. In these circumstances there is nothing to prevent. and no reason to not to suspect an emp !oyer wou Id seek to offer the identical terms and condi tions as an individual agreement. Although the ERA requires union in vo lvement in all collective agreements, incentives such as this informally extend the coverage of co llecti ve bargaining to non-union individual agreements (B iumenfcld et al 2004) .
Discussion
Academic conur1entators have been at pai ns to exp lain the decline of unionization and collective bargaining as disturbing trends in labour market regulation. and they rnay well be. However, it is important to recognize that alternati ve mechanisms may offer employees conti nued protections in the absence of a strong union movement. In this respect free riding may be seen as a cost to unions but a benefit to non-union employees. In other words. provisions such as the 30 day ru le ex tend to both parties the benefits of collective bargaining without imposing transaction costs. and coupled with the growth in alternati\'e forms of emp loyee representation, exp lain why there h::~s not been a stro ng growth in unionization or rum1a l collective bargaining coverage despite the explicit prOllll)tion of both in the ERA.
TuuteJ as enhancing ente rpri se nexibi li ty and individual choice. the changes that have been introduced by -.;ucccssi\'c conservative (and Labo(u) r) governments in Australia and New Zea land arc not representative of shift !'rum a regulated to deregulatcJ labour rnarkct. Indeed labour market regulation has actually increased in many area~. In Austra lia. the introduction of indi vidualiza tion came tllf"L)lfgh the creation of a new bargaining instrumen t. Australi an Workp lace Agreements (in the \\'RA 1996. also replicated in state legislation eg QW A). Attempts by the Coalition Government to regulate union efforts to achieve pattern barga ining arc another obvious e~amplc of increased state intervention. Pattern bargaining represented a clear example of a union movement's response to a conservat ivc govern rTicnt 's intention to diminish arbitration in favour of enterpriseleve l barg:1 ining. In the higher education sector. the
. . cu rrent -t roun o unrversrty enterprrsc agreeme nts maintain a substantinl number (21) of union national mandatory settleme nt po ints th at severe ly restrain diverse outcnmes at the enterprise level. Unhappy wi th the union's choice of bargaining strategy that hns sought to preserve industry standards, the government has not allowed the market or the parties to resolve the question. Instead, the Commonwealth has attempted (once unsuccessfully, and there are now new provisions) to intervene to directly shape the regulatory environment by tying funding of the sector to industrial relations changes that weaken co llective bargaining and union influence in university governance. The Government's initiatives in higher education are indicative of its broader industrial relations strategy. When the Government realized that the regulatory environment it had promoted was not achieving its intended outcome, its response was to intervene further while si multaneously preserving the rhetori c of state abstaining from the labour market to allow parties to engage in private, contractual relations.
Although unable to pass much of its "radical" agenda through the Senate, the Coalition Government is now set to further intervene to restrain the ability of the parties to engage in free collective bargaining. Following the Coalition's recent electoral gains which enable it to control both Houses of Parliament, the Government has signaled its intention to extend unfair dismissal exemptions, introduce secret ballots for union industrial action, and in the building and construction industry, the Government wi ll seek to establish a new industry regulator to facilitate industrial relations "reform".
Conclusion
There has been a substantial degree of institutional change in the regu lation of the labour markets of Australia and New Zealand in the last two decades. In terms of a comparison between the two countries, those who have assessed the period from the mid-1 980s to mid90s argued that institutional change had been more dramatic in New Zealand than in Australi a. However, this assessment needs to be qualifi ed by the view that there has been substantial institutional re-convergence since the mid-1990s, following the election of the Commonwealth Coalition Government in Australia.
While institutional change has provided a convenient compa ri son between these two cases, it tends to overlook some important issues in the regulation of both countries' labour mark ets. Regu lati on does not occur only through trad itional institutional structures. While measures of instit utional change. such as the decline in unionization and co llecti ve bargaining, may appear to point towards a di s-e mbedded market, it is important to recognize patterns of conti nuity in labour market regulation. These patterns of conti nuity include the emergence of new institutional structures or actors, and even, in the case of New Zealand, the re-legitimization of tradi tional instituti ons. To suggest that the replacement of one structure of regulation with another is a case of dcregu lation is to engage in fantasy. It is also fantas tic to assume that there ex ists no labour market regulation m the absence of certai n, pre-defined institutional actors.
The political economy perspective adopted in this paper suggests that any attempt to enable a self-regulating market wi 11 be met by a protective soc ietal response. As the EC A came to represent an attempt to allow employment contracting to "commodify" labour, the Labour Government introduced new provisions to relegitimise the role of unions and collective bargaining to redress what Labour claimed was an inherent inequality in bargaining power between employers and e mployees.
The available evidence suggests that the re-legitimization of these institutions has not had a substantial impact o n either union density or collective bargaining coverage. The most dramatic effect of the ERA has been to force various alternative forms of employee representation to become unions. These associati ons had earlier emerged to provide a facility for employee representation and collective bargaining in the absence of statutory protections for collective employment regulati on during the ECA. Whether as unions or alternative forms of employee representation, these bodies function as a means to enable employers to reach enterprise agreements, and enable e mpl oyees to bargain ing collectively.
The changes introduced by the Coal itio n Government in Australia have not enabled a self-regulating market. The introduction of A WAs saw the introduction of a new institution charged w ith ensuring that agreements on employee outcomes could not fa ll below pre-ex isti ng community standards. Since tak ing up offi ce and implementi ng its first wave of changes in 1996, the Government has proposed an array of amendments to further re-shape the industrial relations environment. Beneath the rhetoric of a neo-liberal agenda, the Government's changes seek to shape rather than fac ilitate bargaining structures and outcomes, particularly in the pockets of the labour market where employees retain the ability to extract major concessions from employers. Notes Flanders ( 1975) defined industria l relations as " the study of the institutions of job regulation". The use of the word regulation re fl ects the mainstream view that industria l relations is a rule making exercise, which according to pluralists such as Dun lop ( 195 8), involved employees and the ir representatives, employers and their representat ives and government agencies. A Marxist definition of industria l re lation s would substitute the word control for regulation (Hyman 1975: 12) .
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For Dunlop ( 1958: vii i-ix) "The centra l task of a theory of industrial re lations is to explai n why particular rules are establ ished in particular industrial-relations systems and how and wh y they change in response to changes affect ing the system. " 3 Polanyi's inte rpretation of labour as a fictitious commodity is by itself an important contribution to industrial re lations. Polanyi demo nstrated his thesis on labour as a fictitious commodity by examining the development of the Poor Laws in the United Kingdom.
'
